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This paper generalizes the original random matching model of money by 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) (KW) in two aspects: first, the economy is 
characterized by an arbitrary distribution of agents who specialize in producing a 
particular consumption good; and second, these agents have preferences such 
that they want to consume any good with some probability. The results depend 
crucially on the size of the fraction of producers of each good and the probability 
with which different agents want to consume each good. KW and other related 
models are shown to be parameterizations of this more general one. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  This paper generalizes the original random matching model of money by 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) (KW) in two aspects: first, the economy is characterized by 
an arbitrary distribution of agents who specialize in producing a particular consumption 
good; and second, these agents have preferences such that they want to consume any 
good with some probability. In contrast, KW assumes a constant distribution of agents 
who are specialized in producing and consuming in a very particular way. We focus on a 
simple three goods-and-agents version of the model. Our goal is to concentrate on the 
role of the patterns of production and consumption of agents in the determination of 
which object emerges as commodity money. In order to do this, storage costs, arguably 
the driving force of some of the main results in the seminal contribution by KW, are 
assumed away and all goods have identical intrinsic properties. As in KW and other 
related papers, we are basically interested in characterizing the circumstances under 
which a particular commodity emerges as medium of exchange. Our results depend 
crucially on the size of the fraction of producers of each good and the probability with 
which different agents want to consume each good. 
 
  There are two previous papers that are related to this. Wright (1995) generalizes 
the KW model introducing arbitrary distributions of specialized producers and 
consumers. Cuadras-Morató and Wright (1997) adds homogeneous generalists 
consumers who, with some common probability, consume any good. We take a step 
further and generalize consumer preferences, so that now producers of each type want to 
consume goods with idiosyncratic probability distributions. 
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  We think that the model is interesting at least for three reasons. First, this is a 
general model, in the sense that the previously mentioned models are particular 
parameterizations of it. Thus, this model can be used as a general framework to analyze 
known results from previous contributions to the literature. Second, we abstract 
completely from storage costs and other intrinsic properties of goods. Our goal is to 
study the effects of the patterns of specialization in production and consumption in the 
emergence of commodity money. The results here depend only on the relative number 
of producers of each goods and the probability with which they want to consume the 
goods. Third, although the model can be solved analytically only for some particular 
cases, it can be solved numerically in general. The equilibrium set is considerably larger 
and gives us new insights into previous results derived from more restrictive models 
and, thus, into the general issue of the nature of commodity money. 
 
  A quick snapshot of the results of the paper is as follows. We first show that 
storage costs are crucial for the existence of monetary equilibria in KW. Second, we 
argue that it is still possible to have monetary equilibria in a very parsimonious way, just 
by assuming a more general distribution of specialized consumers and producers as in 
Wright (1995). Third, we argue that if the structure of preferences is identical for all 
consumers, then the model is equivalent to a representative agent model in which all 
individuals use identical trade strategies, as in Cuadras-Morató and Wright (1997). 
Fourth, we show that a commodity that nobody consumes cannot be commodity money. 
Finally, we present economies with equilibria in which agents accept as commodity 
money goods they will never consume in exchange for goods they would eventually 
have consumed. 
  6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 




2. The model 
 
  The economy is populated by a [0,1] continuum of infinite-lived agents who are 
specialized in producing one of three different consumption goods, each of which will 
be called good i (i = 1,2,3). Production costs, D, are common across producers. The 
fraction of agents specialized in producing good i (type i agents) is σ i (∑iσ i=1). Agents 
are generalists in consumption. At every date, t=0,1,2… each agent gets a taste shock 
that determines the good she desires that period. More specifically, δ ij ( ∑jδ ij=1) 
represents the probability that an agent of type i wants to consume good j (j=1,2,3) at 
any particular period of time.
1 This is independent across inventory holdings and time. If 
a trader desires good j, she gets utility U from consuming good j and zero utility from 
consuming any other good different from j. After consuming a good, traders 
immediately produce one unit of their own production commodity. Agents cannot 
produce unless they have previously consumed. The net utility of the joint action of 
consuming plus producing is denoted by u=U-D. All goods are indivisible and have 
identical properties (durability, portability, storability, etc.). 
 
                                                           
 
1 This is a generalization of the assumption in Cuadras-Morató and Wright (1997), where δ 1j=δ 2j=δ 3j=δ j.  7
Agents are initially endowed with one unit of the good they produce. Given the 
setup of the model, every agent will be always holding one unit of an object. The 
sequence of events will be the following: every period of time, agents start with some 
object in inventory. Then, they get a taste shock. If they are holding the good they want 
to consume, then they consume it, produce a new good and wait for next period. 
Otherwise, they enter a trading process (market) in which they are randomly matched 
with other traders in their same situation. Once matched, the agents have to decide 
whether they want to trade or not. If they want to trade, then they swap inventories one-
for-one. Whenever an agent gets the good she desires, she consumes it and immediately 
produces a new good; otherwise, she keeps the object she obtained and waits for next 
period. If they do not want to trade, then they part company and wait for the next period. 
 
  The strategic decision of traders is the following. At a given period of time, an 
agent in the market is holding some good she does not want to consume (obviously, she 
would never go to the market holding the good she wants to eat). Then, she is paired 
with another agent who offers her one of the two following alternatives: either the good 
she wants to consume today (which would be accepted and consumed immediately) or 
another object which she does not want to eat today either. The only trade decision to be 
made is a choice between two objects that are not desired for immediate consumption. 
To analyze it, let Vij be the value function for a type-i individual, at the end of a period 
holding good j other than the one currently desired for consumption. V ij can be 
interpreted as the value of good j as asset. The structure of taste shocks that we have 
assumed guarantees that Vij does not depend on the good that is desired in the current 
period. The strategic problem of agents can be formalized in the following way: an 
agent of type i will accept good h in exchange for good j iff Vih > Vij (that is, if the value  8
of good h as asset is larger than the value of good j). Iff Vij ≥  Vih, then agents will not 
accept good h in exchange for good j. For most of the paper, we focus on pure strategies 
and assume that agents simply do not want to trade when they are indifferent between 
two goods (it would be enough to assume a positive arbitrarily small transaction cost to 
get this as a result of the model). The behavior of agents of type i can be characterized 
by a ranking of the three value functions corresponding to the three goods of the 
economy. This can be represented by a strategy vector of three elements  ,...) (...,s s
i
hj
i =  
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where j is the good held by agent i and h is the good that is being offered in exchange. 
The behavior of all agents can be summarized by s=(…s
i…). 
 
  As it is customary in this literature, commodity money in this economy is any 
object that is accepted by an agent not to be consumed immediately, but because of its 
relative high value as asset. In equilibrium, each agent ranks all objects from more 
acceptable to less acceptable, reflecting their relative liquidity in the economy. 
 
  In order to continue the analysis, we need to specify some notation. Let pij denote 
the measure of type i agents with good j at the start of a period, (∑jpij=σ i). Let p=(… 
pij,…). The total number of agents with good j who go to the market is ∑i(1-δ ij) pij and 
the total number of agents who go to the market is N=∑j∑i[(1-δ ij) pij]. Given s, the 
distribution p evolves according to some law of motion p’=f(p;s). A steady state is a 
solution to p=f(p;s).  9
 
  Given all this, it is straightforward to write the flow value functions in the 
following form  ∑∑
≠≠
≠ − + + − + =
j kj k
i
jk kj ih ij ik kj ik ij ij ii ij j,k h s ε )δ V (V ) ε δ )(δ V V (u rV , 
where r>0 is the rate of time preference and  ∑ ≠ + =
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, is the 
probability of meeting in the market an agent who holds good h and is willing to accept 
good  j  in exchange. From this definition of the payoffs functions, the following 
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23 s and 
1
31 s  and also for agents of type 2 and 3. 
 
  We are now ready to define the equilibrium of the model.  
 
DEFINITION. A steady state, pure-strategy equilibrium is a vector s of strategies 
s=(…  s
i…),  i∈ {1,2,3} and a steady state distribution p such that: a) given p, the 
incentive compatibility conditions (IC) hold; and b) given s, p=f(p;s). 
 
  The following result will be helpful to solve some versions of the model: 
 
 LEMMA.  If  δ ij=1, then in equilibrium 
i
jh s= 0  and 
i
hj s= 1 ,  h ≠ j, h,j∈ {1,2,3}.  10




  3. Results 
 
  The procedure to solve the model (both numerically and analytically) and present 
some results involves the following steps: 
 
1. Define  an  economy (δ ,σ ) 
2.  Make hypothesis about the equilibrium strategies (s)  
3. Compute  p’s and ε ’s (the Appendix includes the system of nonlinear 
equations which characterizes the steady state distribution p) 
4.  Check that the incentive compatibility conditions (IC) hold. 
 
  Despite the simplicity of the setting up of the model, its analysis is not 
straightforward at least for two reasons: first, the number of potential equilibria is very 
large; and second, the computation of the inventory distribution involves solving a 
system of nonlinear equations which does not allow to get general analytical results. 
This will only be possible for particular cases of the model. Nevertheless, the model can 
always be solved numerically. 
 
  The following lines present the results for some simple economies, comparing 
them with previous literature. 
  11













, , σ . This is the case of agents uniformly specialized in production and 




Proposition 1. In Economy 1 there does not exist any pure strategy equilibrium.  
 
It should not come as a surprise that the pure strategy equilibria of the KW 
model, which crucially depend on storage costs, disappear once we abstract from those. 
Intuitively, without storage costs, all goods in this economy are perfectly symmetric. 
This means that the only possible equilibria ought to keep this same symmetric structure 
(see below). Despite this non-existence result, the model is still capable of supporting 
equilibria in which commodity money is accepted in a very parsimonious way. 
 
  To see this, let us now define Economy 2 as δ 1=(0,0,1), δ 2=(1,0,0), δ 3=(0,1,0), 
and  σ =(σ 1,σ 2,σ 3). This is identical to Economy 1, but for general distributions of 
production types. This is the case analyzed in Wright (1995). The following result holds. 
 




3=(1,0,0) is an equilibrium. (Relabeling the goods 
accordingly we obtain the other two equilibria). 
 
                                                           
 
2 The proofs involve mainly very simple algebra, the details of which are relegated to the Appendix.  12
If σ 1>1/2, then good 2 emerges as the only commodity money. Since all goods 
are identical, to have one of them acting as the unique commodity money, we need some 
kind of asymmetry in the economy that characterizes this particular good and makes it 
different from the rest. The only source of such an asymmetry in Economy 2 is the 
distribution of production types. In this particular case, producers of good 1 (who are 
also consumers of good 3) are relatively numerous. This means that the best strategy for 
agents who produce good 3 is to stick with it. Since they are consumers of good 2, 
agents of type 1 will find it useful to accept and hold good 2 in order to trade it for their 
consumption good. This means that agents who produce good 2 (and consume 1) will be 
able to get their consumption good by holding their production good (in fact, they are 
perfectly indifferent between holding goods 2 and 3, so they will never accept good 3). 
Summing up, good 2 is the only good that is accepted as commodity money by agents of 
type 1. As it has already been noted, in this economy in which storage costs are zero, all 
goods have identical properties. This means that any existing equilibrium has to be 
accompanied by other two, which are mere products of renaming the goods of the 
economy. 
 
  Figure 1 represents the space of the parameters for which the three different 
equilibria exist. Note that there is an area of the parameter space for which there does 
not exist any pure strategy equilibrium. Our hypothesis is that there exist mixed strategy 
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  Let us define Economy 3 as  ) ,δ ,δ (δ δ δ δ
* * *
3 2 1 3 2 1 = = =  and σ =(σ 1,σ 2,σ 3). This is 
the economy analyzed in Cuadras-Morató and Wright (1997). 
 
Proposition 3. [Proposition 1 in Cuadras-Morató and Wright (1997)]. All 





Homogeneous preferences for goods mean that this is equivalent to a 
representative agent economy in which everybody uses identical trading strategies. 
Agents are heterogeneous in this economy because they produce different goods. 
Nevertheless, since they draw their taste shocks from the same distribution, this type of 
heterogeneity does not affect their trading strategies at all. 
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d:   no pure strategy equilibrium 
 
Figure 1. Equilibria with δ 1=(0,0,1), δ 2=(1,0,0), δ 3=(0,1,0)  14
      Economy 4 is defined as δ 1=(0, δ 12, 1-δ 12), δ 2=(0, δ 22, 1-δ 22), and δ 3=(0, δ 32, 1-
δ 32). This is an economy characterized by the fact that there is a good (good 1 in this 
particular case) that nobody ever consumes. 
 
  Proposition 4. In Economy 4, equilibria are always of the form s
i=(1, 
i s23, 0). 
 
Proposition 4 says that all equilibria in Economy 4 are such that good 1 is never 
accepted in exchange for another good. It is worth going into the details of this. In KW, 
a good that nobody ever consumes, fiat money, is proved to be acceptable as medium of 
exchange under some circumstances. Here good 1, a good nobody consumes, is never 
going to be accepted as media of exchange. The reason is that good 1 is not the same as 
fiat money in KW because is produced by agents of type 1. Suppose, for instance, that 
good 1 was accepted by some agent (obviously not to consume it). Agents of type 1 
would get goods they could eventually consume. After consuming them, they would 
produce good 1, but then goods of type 1 would become so abundant that, in the end, 
would make no sense to accept them in exchange for something that can eventually be 
consumed. Note that this result generalizes some of the results in Proposition 3 in 
Cuadras-Morató and Wright (1997).
3 
 
  Notice that, so far, we have not proved that an agent may prefer a good she can 
never consume (obviously only to use it as money) to another good that she may 
                                                           
3 Although the result is similar, the logic underlying it is somehow different in Cuadras-Morató and 
Wright (1997). In that model, everybody has identical consumption preferences. Suppose that there is 
some good that everybody wants to consume with very high probability and suppose someone accepted 
the good that is never consumed (good 1) as commodity money because she thinks that this will make it 
easier to get the most consumed good. Notice though, that the latter is at least as acceptable by everyone 
as good 1 and, besides, can be consumed. This means that the holder of that good will not be willing to 
accept good 1 and, so, nobody else will.  15
eventually consume. This is partly due to the particular assumptions about consumption 
preferences in the economies we have studied above. For instance, in Economies 1 and 
2 agents are completely specialized in consumption. This means that accepting the own 
consumption good is always the best strategy. There might be commodity money, but it 
would never be preferred to the only good one wants to consume. One could imagine, 
however, economies in which agents, who do not consume at all a particular good, still 
accept it as commodity money and rank it above goods they eventually consume. This 
can be seen as the next proposition. 
 
  Let us first define Economy 5 as δ 1=(0,δ ,1-δ ),  δ 2=(0,δ ,1-δ ),  δ 3=(1,0,0), and 
() σ σ,σ, σ 2 1− =  (σ <½). The following proposition holds. 
 













3=(0,1,1) is an equilibrium. 
 
Notice that in this particular equilibrium, good 1, which agents of type 1 and 2 
never consume, will be preferred by both types to good 2, which they consume with 
positive (but not too big) probability. This is because type 3 agents, who are relatively 
numerous, have good 3 (they produce it) and are willing to consume good 1. What 
makes this equilibrium interesting is the fact that a relatively large number of agents 
willing to consume a good may induce other agents, for whom this good does not have 
any consumption value, to prefer it and use it as commodity money, accepting it in 
exchange for goods that they eventually consume. 
   16
 
  4. Summary and conclusions 
 
  We have presented a general equilibrium model that further generalizes the 
consumer preference structure of the existing random matching models of commodity 
money. We analyze the equilibrium conditions and focus on what commodities appear 
as money. The results depend on the size of the fraction of producers of each good and 
the probability with which different agents want to consume each good. Previous 




  Appendix 
 
  Steady-state distribution of inventories 
 
  In order to find the steady state distribution of inventories, the following system 
of equations ought to be solved  (for i,j=1,2,3): 
 
[ ] (A1) h,i k ) s ε (ε δ ε δ δ p s ε δ p
i hi h
i
ji ij kj ik ih ii ih ih
i
ik ki ih ii ≠ + + + = ∑∑
≠≠
 
[ ] A2) ( ∑
≠
≠ ≠ = + + + +
j h
i
hj jh im ih
i
ji ij kj ik
i
jk kj ij ii ij ij h m j,i k s ε δ p ) s ε (ε δ ) s ε (ε δ δ p  
(A3) ∑ =
j
ij i p σ  
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  Proofs of results 
 
  Proofs of the results of the paper imply very simple and repetitive algebra. In 
what follows we sketch the proofs of the propositions, but do not go over all the details 
of them. 
 
  Proof of Proposition 1 
  By Lemma, the equilibria in Economy 1 will be of the form 







1 s s s s s s = = = . This means that there are eight candidate 
strategy sets to be equilibrium. We need to check whether the incentive compatibility 
conditions (IC) hold for each of them. 
  
  We first conjecture the following equilibrium strategy set: 
) 0 , 0 , 1 ( , ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( ), 0 , 1 , 1 (
3 2 1 = = = s s s . From (A1)-(A3), p31=p32=p21=p23=p13=0, 
p33=p22=1/3, and p11=p12=1/6. Consequently, ε 31=0, ε 21=ε 32=1/3, and ε 12=ε 13=ε 23=1/6. 
From (IC), it is easy to check that V31>V33, so  0
3
31 = s cannot be part of the equilibrium. 
Hence, the above strategy set is not equilibrium. By symmetry, 
) 0 , 0 , 1 ( , ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( ), 0 , 1 , 0 (
3 2 1 = = = s s s  and  ) 1 , 0 , 1 ( , ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( ), 0 , 1 , 0 (
3 2 1 = = = s s s  are not 
equilibrium either. Similar arguments apply to the rest of candidate equilibria. 
  
  Proof of Proposition 2 
  By Lemma, we have again the same candidate equilibria as in Proposition 1. We 
proceed in an identical manner. We conjecture the following equilibrium strategy set:  18
) 0 , 0 , 1 ( , ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( ), 0 , 1 , 1 (
3 2 1 = = = s s s . From (A1)-(A3), p31=p32=p21=p23=0,  p33=σ 3, 

























. It is easy to check that V12>V11 and V22=V23, so 
1
1
12 = s  and  0
2
23 = s are optimal strategies. Also, V33>V31 iff σ 1>½. Applying a symmetry 
argument, we have that  ) 0 , 0 , 1 ( , ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( ), 0 , 1 , 0 (
3 2 1 = = = s s s  is equilibrium iff σ 2>½ and 
) 1 , 0 , 1 ( , ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( ), 0 , 1 , 0 (
3 2 1 = = = s s s iff σ 3>½. Following the same steps is easy to check 
that the incentive compatibility conditions (IC) do not hold for the rest of the candidate 
equilibria. 
 
  Proof of Proposition 3 
  We remit the readers to Proposition 1 in Cuadras-Morató and Wright (1997). 
 
  Proof of Proposition 4 
  The logic underlying this result would be the following. Suppose that there was 
an equilibrium in which, for some i, 1 12 ≠
i s  and  0 31 ≠
i s . In such equilibrium, good 1 
would be used as medium of exchange, but it would be never consumed. Every time 
producers of good 1 got to consume some good, however, they would produce 
afterwards a unit of good 1. This means that the amount of agents carrying good 1 
would grow. Eventually good 1 would be ubiquitous and, hence, valueless (there will be 
too much of it) and agents would refuse to accept in exchange for a good they may want 
to consume eventually. By backward induction, good 1 is unacceptable, so  1 12 =
i s  and 
0 31 =
i s .     19
 
  Proof of Proposition 5 
  Given the strategies that we hypothesize, we have that 
N























) ( 21 11
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p p 21 11
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+
= ε . By 
Lemma, 0
3
12 = s  and  1
3
31 = s . Also, from the examination of the incentive compatibility 
conditions (IC), it is immediate to conclude that  1
3









23 = = s s  if the following inequality holds: 
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Since now ε 23=ε 21, it will be sufficient to prove that  0 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 32 23 < − − + − ε δ ε δ . 
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<  are sufficient conditions that guarantee that the 




12 = = s s  if the following inequality holds: 
 
[] () [] 0 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 31 32 23 23 32 31 21 > − − + − + + − + − − + − δε ε δ ε δ δε δ ε ε δ ε δ r  
 
Notice that we have already provided sufficient conditions for the second part of the 
inequality to be positive. We need to evaluate the sign of  ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 32 31 21 ε ε δ ε δ − − + − . 
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